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ABSTRACT
This paper describes an approach where group testing helps
in enforcing security and privacy in identification. We detail
a particular scheme based on embedding and group testing.
We add a second layer of defense, group vectors, where each
group vector represents a set of dataset vectors. Whereas
the selected embedding poorly protects the data when used
alone, the group testing approach makes it much harder to
reconstruct the data when combined with the embedding.
Even when curious server and user collude to disclose the
secret parameters, they cannot accurately recover the data.
Another byproduct of our approach is that it reduces the
complexity of the search and the required storage space. We
show the interest of our work in a benchmark biometrics
dataset, where we verify our theoretical analysis with real
data.
1. INTRODUCTION
This paper considers a typical scenario involving the fol-
lowing three entities. The owner O has a collection of N
objects. The user U would like to know whether there is an
object in this collection similar enough to query object, and
in that case, which object it is. The owner is not willing
to operate the identification and outsources this task to a
server S. The targeted applications are typically related to
multimedia retrieval, medical diagnosis, biometrics. In the
later case, the owner O is a personification of the enrollment
phase. A feature vector is extracted from the objects (iris,
face captures) and used as a proxy: similar objects share
similar features. Overall, this boils down to managing a
database of vectors probed with query vectors.
We add the following privacy / security requirements:
• U doesn’t want to reveal his query,
• O is reluctant in disclosing his database.
In other words, S, the outsourced server is not trusted. This
actor is deemed as semi-honest (or honest but curious): it
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operates the search task, however it tries to grab information
about the query or the database. This would allow S to
profile U , i.e. to disclose what U is interested in, or to
perform the search with unauthorized users, i.e. without
the agreement of O. In biometrics application, disclosing
database vectors could lead to spoofing [5]. Some make the
distinction between the privacy, which protects user U , and
the security, which protect the data of the owner O.
Section 2 describes a classical solution based on embed-
ding and secure multiparty computation. We selected the
LSH embedding which maps real vectors to binary hashes.
Evaluating the cosine similarity between vectors amounts to
computing the Hamming distance between their hashes. We
use a very efficient cryptographic protocol called SHADE for
securing Hamming distances computations1: while S learns
nothing from the query, U learns nothing from the database
vector except the index of the most similar vector. This sys-
tem enables privacy under the semi-honest model, but the
security of owner’s data is weak if U and S collude.
This weakness is due to S having binary hashes in the
clear. The main counter-measure in literature is fully ho-
momorphic encryption. It allows computing distances be-
tween two ciphers s.t. S now manipulates data previously
encrypted by O. However, computation in the encrypted
domain is very low preventing the scalability of the system.
This paper trades privacy of the user and security of the
data for scale of the database, speed of similarity search and
quality of the identification. This is achieved by resorting to
advanced signal processing rather than more cryptography.
Section 3 describes a second version of the system adding on
top of LSH and SHADE a group testing scheme for dealing
with efficiency of the search while leaking only very little
useful information.
1.1 Setup
The owner O has a database of vectors X := {xi}N1 s.t.
xi ∈ Rd with Euclidean norm ‖xi‖ = 1, ∀i ∈ [N ], where
[N ] := {1, · · · , N}. We denote the query of the user by
q ∈ Rd with ‖q‖ = 1. The similarity between the query and
a database vector x is defined by s(q,x) := q⊤x.
In this paper, we analyse the proposed system having in
mind biometrics identification. Database vectors are bio-
metrics recorded at the enrollment phase. U is interested in
knowing the index of the most similar vector in the database
if similar enough:
ιˆ :=
{
argmaxi∈[N ] s(q,xi) if s(q,xιˆ) ≥ ρ
∅ otherwise (1)
1Another option is partial homomorphic encryption
There are two cases: The query is a noisy version of an en-
rolled vector xi⋆ ; or the query is random and we denote
i⋆ = ∅. For a given threshold ρ, three errors are possible:
False negative: ιˆ = ∅ while i⋆ 6= ∅
False identification: ιˆ 6= i⋆ while i⋆ 6= ∅
False positive: ιˆ 6= ∅ while i⋆ = ∅
We denote by Pfn, Pfid, and Pfp respectively the probabili-
ties of these events. The ‘real’ search defined in (1) produces
non zero error probabilities depending on how strongly the
query is correlated with xi⋆ (when i
⋆ 6= ∅ ) and on the size
N of the database. Due to privacy, S can not perform the
real search as defined above. In agreement with O, S runs
a secure and approximate search with lower performances.
1.2 LSH Binary Embedding
An embedding casts a vector x ∈ Rd into a vector of D
discrete components.
e : Rd → AD (2)
x → e(x) := (e(x)1, · · · , e(x)D)
This function is designed to provide i) a compact representa-
tion of vectors, and ii) an estimation of the similarity s(q,x)
between two vectors from their embeddings: se(e(q), e(x)).
Function se(·, ·) is faster to compute than s(·, ·).
We propose to use one of the most well-known binary em-
beddings, LSH [4], where A = {0, 1}. In a nutshell, once
D directions {ak}Dk=1 have been randomly drawn i.i.d. uni-
formly in Rd, the k-th symbol of the embedding is computed
as follows:
e(x)k := sign(x
⊤ak), ∀k ∈ [D], (3)
with sign(x) := 1 if x ≥ 0, and 0 otherwise. LSH has the
following well-known property:
x⊤q
‖x‖‖q‖ ≈ cos
( pi
D
dH(e(q), e(x))
)
. (4)
The cosine is estimated via the Hamming distance dH(·, ·).
In our setup, database and query vectors have unit norm,
the cosine is thus the metric we use to quantify similarity.
1.3 SHADE Protocol
Suppose now that U and S have respectively the binary
wordswU andwS , and that dH(w
U ,wS) is needed. SHADE
is an efficient protocol [3] allowing U to learn nothing about
wS except dH(w
U ,wS), while S gains no information about
wU . In short, at the k-th round, S creates two messages:
m
(k)
0 = w
S
k + rk and m
(k)
1 = (w
S
k
⊕
1) + rk, where rk is an
alea uniformly distributed over ZD+1. Thanks to an obliv-
ious transfer, U receives vk := m(k)
wU
k
. After D rounds, S
sends R :=
∑D
k=1 rk to U who computes V :=
∑D
k=1 vk
and V − R = dH(wU ,wS). SHADE is secure in the static
semi-honest model: U and S are honest but curious. There
is an efficient version of SHADE for computing a batch of
Hamming distances between one query and N vectors [2].
1.4 Adding Comparison and Minimum
Letting U learning the Hamming distance dH(wU ,wS) is
dangerous in the dynamic model where U is allowed to per-
form several distance computations: With D well chosen
queries, U can disclose wS . The authors of SHADE recom-
mend the use of the GMW protocol [8] to first securely com-
pare V −R to a threshold τ . U only gets sign(dH(wU ,wS)−
τ). For a batch of distances, their minimum is securely com-
puted and U only learns ιˆ = argmin dH(wU ,wS).
2. FIRST VERSION OF THE SYSTEM
A system is a list of procedures followed by the three ac-
tors O, S and U . The owner O draws D random directions
stacked in matrix A := [a1, · · · ,aD], computes the embed-
dings of its vectors, and sends S the database E := {e(xi)}.
O grants U the access of the identification by sending A so
that U can compute the embedding of its query q.
At query time, entities U and S perform the SHADE pro-
tocol, where wU = e(q) and wS = e(xi) with the batch
option. U maps the Hamming distances dH(e(xi), e(q)) to
similarity estimates sˆ(q,xi) thanks to (4). U finds the index
with the biggest similarity and takes it as the output if it is
above the threshold ρ. The search is approximate because
it is based on similarity estimates.
An option is to add GMV protocol to let U learn either
indices of vectors whose approximated similarity with the
query is above a threshold (secure comparison), or the in-
dex of the vector whose approximated similarity is maximum
(secure maximum). Note that this is done on the Hamming
distances because (4) is a monotonic mapping. A combina-
tion of the two implement the search as defined in (1).
2.1 Analysis
Complexity: The quality of the approximate search de-
pends on D, the embedding length. For any two vectors x
and q s.t. q⊤x = cos(θ), andA randomly generated as early
described, π
D
dH(e(q), e(x)) in (4) is indeed an estimation of
θ with no bias and variance θ(pi− θ)/D. However, the com-
plexity of the SHADE protocol deeply depends on D. The
secure computation of a batch of size N has a complexity [2]:
C ∝ [(2ND log2(D))/o+ 3D]Csym, (5)
where o is a constant setting the security of the protocol
(at least 128), and Csym is the complexity of one symmetric
cryptography operation (i.e. AES encryption / decryption).
Even though SHADE has been a breakthrough consider-
ably lowering the complexity of the secure computation of
Hamming distances, it is the bottleneck of our system. It
takes 0.2s to securely compute and run the GMV protocol
over N = 200 embeddings of length D = 900 (see [2]).
Security: SHADE enables the privacy of U , but the
owner O has some concerns. The parameter of the em-
bedding (here matrix A) is generated by the owner O and
only shared with U . This parameter is the only secret that
prevents a curious server S from performing illegal identifi-
cation or estimating the database vectors by inverting the
embedding. By colluding with one user, S learns this secret.
Since (2) is a surjection, the embedding is not reversible
and perfect reconstruction of X is impossible. However, one
can see the embedding as a quantizer producing quantifica-
tion noise. Sect. 2.2 measures the accuracy of a reconstruc-
tion of x from e(x) provided matrix A is known.
2.2 Inverting LSH
A simple reconstruction of a unit norm vector x from its
embedding is:
xˆ = κ(A(2e(x)− 1D)), (6)
where κ is s.t. EA[‖xˆ‖2] = 1. To quantify its accuracy,
we introduce a(x) := x⊤xˆ. The closer to 1, the better the
reconstruction. We have:
a(x) = κ
D∑
k=1
|a⊤k x|. (7)
LSH was originally proposed with {ak} being independent
random directions in Rd. In this case, the appendix shows:
EA[a(x)] ≈
√
g
1 + g
with g :=
2D
pid
. (8)
However, if D ≤ d, it is known that A being a random
basis of rank D yields a better search [11]. In this case,
‖A(2e(x)− 1D)‖2 = D for any x. The appendix shows:
EA[a(x)] ≈ √g with g ≤ 1. (9)
If D > d, a good choice is A as a random tight frame [10]
s.t. ‖A(2e(x)− 1D)‖2 = d/D‖2e(x)− 1D)‖2 = d. Yet, the
r.v. a⊤k x are no longer independent and it is hard to say
something more than:√
2
pi
≈ 0.80 ≤ EA[a(x)] ≤ 1. (10)
Approximate search based on LSH embedding usually sets
D > d. On expectation, xˆ is then a good approximation of
x since they correlate more than 0.8.
Fig. 4 shows the reconstruction accuracy w.r.t. D, when
A is a random tight frame or random Gaussian matrix.
2.3 Lessons Learnt from the First System
The parameter of utmost importance is the length of the
embedding D. It sets a trade-off between the quality of
the identification, the complexity of the protocol, and the
security when A has been compromised. Yet, this trade-off
is poor as the reconstruction provides a good accuracy when
D > d.
3. THE PROPOSED SYSTEM
Our aim is to provide a second line of defense. Group
testing was recently introduced in approximate search. The
idea is to pack database vectors into groups and to compute
a representation per group, so-called memory vector, which
allows to perform a group test. This test reveals whether the
query is similar to at least one of the vectors in the group.
For large dimension d, more vectors can be packed into one
group because the correlation between two independent vec-
tors with unit norm concentrates around 0.
Each database vector belongs to several groups. The de-
coding aims at identifying the matching vector(s) from the
results of the group tests. A matching vector is defined as
having a similarity with the query high enough: s(q,x) ≥ α.
Naively, matching vectors are lying at the intersection of the
groups yielding a positive group test. Things are not that
simple because these tests suffer from false positives and
false negatives. Yet, if the number of groups is large enough,
the decoding succeeds in identifying matching vectors.
This approach brings two advantages to our system:
• The number of groupsM is smaller than the number of
vectors N . This lowers both the storage space and the
complexity of the protocol by a gain γ := M/N < 1.
• O will not give S embeddings of database vectors, but
of memory vectors. This makes harder the reconstruc-
tion of database vectors.
Table 1: Definition of the weights
bi,j = 1 bi,j = 0
Hi η = 1 η = 0
H¯i η = (n− 1)/N η = n/N
3.1 Encoding
The owner O randomly packs the N database vectors into
M groups {Gj}Mj=1 s.t. i) any group comprises n vectors, ii)
any vector belongs to m groups. This rules enforces that
M = mN/n. A possible construction is explained in [7]. We
call the map the M ×N binary matrix B indicating which
vector belongs to which group: bi,j = 1 if xi belongs to
group Gj , 0 otherwise.
Then, O computes the memory vectors, i.e. the repre-
sentatives of each group. We adopt here the most simple
constructions investigated in [7]:
mj =
∑
i:bi,j=1
xi. (11)
Finally, O computes the embeddings of the memory vec-
tors and sends S the following compact description E ′ =
{e(mj)}Mj=1. O sends U parameters (A,B, {‖mj‖}Mj=1): A
is needed to compute query embedding, B and {‖mj‖}Mj=1
to decode the tests. Note that the database E ′ is smaller
than E since it has M < N entries.
3.2 Querying
U computes e(q) thanks to A and runs the SHADE pro-
tocol with S, who learns nothing about the query. U obtains
estimations of the cosine between q andmj . Multiplying by
the norm ‖mj‖, this gives estimated similarities sˆj ≈ q⊤mj .
The big benefit is the decrease of SHADE complexity,
which was the bottleneck of the previous system. Instead of
securely computing N Hamming distances dH(e(q), e(xi)),
we compute M < N distances dH(e(q), e(mj)).
Soft decoding: From {sˆj}Mj=1 and map B, U runs the
decoding to identify i⋆, index of the matching vector.
In summary, the decoding computes N scores. ci is the
likelihood ratio w.r.t. two hypothesis: xi is the matching
vector (Hi) or not (H¯i).
ci =
M∑
j=1
log
fHi(sˆj , bi,j)
fH¯i(sˆj , bi,j)
, (12)
where the pdfs are modeled as mixtures of two Gaussian
distributions, ηN (α; (n− 1)/d)+ (1− η)N (0;n/d), with pa-
rameter η given in Table 1. We refer the reader to [7] for
justifications of this statistical model. Then, U computes the
maximum of these scores and compares with the threshold.
Hard decoding: To prevent oracle attacks from U , we
use the GMW protocol to apply a secure comparison: U
learns nothing more than dj = sign(sˆj − τ), where threshold
τ has been carefully selected by O. Then, the decoding
computes the following scores:
ci =
M∑
j=1
dj log
pHi(bi,j)
pH¯i(bi,j)
+ (1− dj) log 1− pHi(bi,j)
1− pH¯i(bi,j)
, (13)
with pHi(bi,j) = Esˆj∼fHi (sˆj ,bi,j)[sˆj > τ ]:
pHi(bi,j) = ηΦ
(
(τ − α)
√
d
n− 1
)
+ (1− η)Φ
(
τ
√
d
n
)
and parameter η given in Table 1.
4. SECURITY
Unauthorized identification is possible whenever an un-
trusted actor, be it U and/or S, has in his hands both
(A,B, {‖mj‖}Mj=1) and E ′. This happens only when S and
U colluded, or if U succeeds to steal E ′.
The group testing approach brings a second line of de-
fense by mixing the database vectors into memory vectors.
We focus here on the reconstruction of the database vectors.
To do so, the untrusted actor must i) reconstruct the mem-
ory vectors by ‘inverting’ their embeddings, and ii) estimate
database vectors from the reconstructed memory vectors of
groups they belong to. Reconstruction i) needs E ′, A and
{‖mj‖}. The quality of the reconstruction is quite high as
shown in Sec. 2.2. Estimation ii) needs B. The quality of
the reconstruction is investigated in the next section.
4.1 Inverting Memory Units
Equation (11) can be rephrased asM = XB⊤ whereM :=
[m1, · · · ,mM ] is a d×M matrix storing the memory units
while X := [x1, · · · ,xN ] stores the database vectors and B
is the map (See Sect. 3.1). Estimating back X from M is
possible using a ridge regression or the pseudo-inverse ofB⊤:
Xˆ ∝M(B⊤)†. We can show that reconstructing x from the
exact memory units, produces an estimation xˆ s.t.
E[a(x)] = min(1,
√
γ). (14)
Yet, this requires the inverse of large M ×M matrix BB⊤.
The average of some memory vectors albeit not optimal is
faster: Xˆ ∝MB achieving (ν := n/N):
E[a(x)] ≈
√
γ
1 + ν2(M − 1) + γ(1− ν)2 . (15)
4.2 Full Reconstruction
The attacker first reconstructs the group vectors {mˆk}
from their embeddings {e(mk)}, and then reconstructs the
database vectors {xˆi}. It is easy to show that if the first step
produces a reconstruction accuracy measured by E[a(m)] =
a1 while the second step achieves E[a(x)] = a2 starting from
true memory vectors, then the total reconstruction yields
E[a(x)] = a1a2 thanks to the linearity of the second step.
This is evidenced in the experimental work.
5. EXPERIMENTS
5.1 Experimental Setup
We test our system using both synthetic and real data.
For both cases, we keep the ratio γ = M/N = m/n = 0.1.
This means that the retrieval system needs only 0.1 of mem-
ory storage and vector comparisons compared to exhaustive
search. The embedding is parametrized s.t. D = 2d.
Synthetic Data. We create a synthetic dataset of N vec-
tors distributed randomly on the unit hypersphere of Rd. We
then create Nq random query vectors, such that each query
has exactly one match in the dataset, xi⋆ , and the similarity
between the query and the matching vector is q⊤xi⋆ = α.
We set d = 1, 920, N = 10, 000, Nq = 100, and α = 0.5.
Real Data. We also use Labeled Faces in the Wild (LFW)
dataset [6], which has 13,233 images of 5,749 people. For
the query set, we choose a random image from people who
have i) at least two images , ii) have at least one match
with a similarity greater than or equal to α. We use the
full (d = 67, 584) Fisher face descriptors [9] to calculate
the similarities to generate the query set. Then, we use
the same query set for all experiments, regardless of differ-
ent descriptors or dimensionality. Setting α = 0.5 gives us
Nq = 104 queries, each belonging to a different person. We
also choose 1, 000 random queries from people who have no
other matching vectors. All queries and random queries are
removed from the dataset.
For our experiments, we reduce the dimension of Fisher
face descriptors from 67, 584 to 1, 920 for fair comparison
with synthetic data. We also use CNN-based descriptors [1],
whose dimension is reduced from 4, 096 to 1, 920.
Parameters setting. As stated earlier, we can set the
ratio of M/N = 0.1 with different m and n combinations.
We choose the optimal setting empirically by maximizing
the Kullback-Leibler distance between negative and positive
distributions. This gives n = 200, m = 20, and τ = 0.8× α.
Evaluation. The three metrics for evaluating the perfor-
mance are the probabilities of the three types of error, Pfp,
Pfn and Pfid as functions of threshold ρ (see Sect. 1.1). Se-
curity is gauged by the quality of the reconstruction of the
database vectors measured by E[a(x)].
5.2 Approximate Search
Fig. 1 shows the performance of the identification of the
baseline, i.e. the exhaustive search on real vectors, without
any privacy and security issues, as defined in (1). Fig. 2
shows the same evaluation for the first system described in
Sect. 2. Fig. 3 shows the system proposed in Sect. 3 with
the hard decoding variant (13). We are smoothly degrading
the performance of the approximate search over synthetic
data, however it still performs well on the real dataset.
5.3 Security
Fig. 4 shows the reconstruction performance while invert-
ing LSH with the synthetic dataset. It encompasses two
matrix A generation procedures: Gaussian i.i.d. entries and
uniform tight frame. The latter option is known to produce
better approximate search. This illustrates the security of
the first system described in Sect. 2. In our setup where
D = 2d, we end up with E[a(x)] ≈ 0.88.
Fig. 5 shows the reconstruction performance while invert-
ing the memory units with m ∈ [2, 20] and n = 200 on the
synthetic dataset. It encompasses two reconstruction meth-
ods: the pseudo inverse of B and the average of memory
vectors (See Sect. 4.1). This illustrates the security improve-
ment thanks to the second line of defense provided by group
testing. In our setup where n = 200 and m = 20, we end up
with E[a(x)] ≈ 0.33.
Overall, the reconstruction of vectors {xi} from {e(mk)}
outputs estimates correlated on expactation E[a(x)] ≈ 0.88×
0.33 = 0.29. We run the attack on the real datasets and get
E[a(x)] ≈ 0.88× 0.31 = 0.27.
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Figure 1: Baseline performance, synthetic and LFW
(Fisher / deep learning features) datasets.
6. CONCLUSION
We presented a privacy and security enhancing scheme for
approximate search. It is built upon a first version which en-
ables users privacy but not security of the owner’s data espe-
cially when user and server collude. Contrary to the “Signal
Processing in the Encrypted Domain” trend which uses even
more advanced cryptographic primitives like full homomor-
phic encryption, we propose an alternative only based on
signal processing. It is much faster and more scalable (even
more that the first version). Yet, the attack is not absolutely
blocked, but relatively in the sense that vector reconstruc-
tion is so bad that it can’t be exploited.
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APPENDIX
A. RECONSTRUCTION FROM LSH
Assuming that A has an isotropic distribution (either in-
dependent Gaussian entries or a random frame), w.l.o.g. we
set x = (1, 0, . . . , 0) and
‖xˆ‖2 = κ2

 D∑
k=1
‖ak‖2 +
∑
k 6=ℓ
|ak(1)||aℓ(1)|

 (16)
If ak(1) ∼ N (0, 1), EA[‖xˆ‖2] = κ2D(d+ 2(D − 1)/pi) and
κ ≈
√
1
Dd(1 + g)
with g :=
2D
pid
. (17)
For this x, a(x) = κ
∑D
k=1 |ak(1)| s.t.
EA[a(x)] = κD
√
2/pi =
√
g
1 + g
. (18)
If ak is uniformly distributed on the unit sphere (random
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Figure 3: Proposed system performance, synthetic
and LFW (Fisher / deep learning features) datasets.
uniform frame or basis), the marginal distribution of ak(1):
f(s) =
(1− s2) d−32
B(1/2, (d− 1)/2) , ∀s,−1 ≤ s ≤ 1, (19)
s.t. E[|ak(1)|] =
√
2/dpi(d − 2)!!/(d − 1)!! ≈ √2/dpi. For
D ≤ d, the random uniform tight frame is indeed a basis:
EA[‖xˆ‖2] = D and EA[a(x)] = √g.
B. RECONSTRUCTION FROM MEMORY
We assume the following model for matrix B. For row
r, 1 ≤ r ≤ M , we randomly select n indices in [N ] and set
these coefficients to 1. With a high probability rank(B) = M
and Tr(BB⊤) = nM . As for the vector, EX[X
⊤X] = IN .
Pseudo-inverse reconstruction: Xˆ = ηM(B⊤)†, with
(B⊤)† = (BB⊤)−1B. Constant η is s.t. the expectation
(over X and B) of the average squared norm of xˆi equals 1.
E[
∑N
i=1 ‖xˆi‖2]
N
= E[Tr(Xˆ⊤Xˆ)]/N (20)
= η2E[Tr(X⊤XB⊤(BB⊤)−1B)]/N
= η2E[Tr((BB⊤)−1BB⊤)]/N = η2M/N
The expectation of the average correlation is given by:
E[
∑j
i=1 x
⊤
i xˆi]
N
= E[Tr(X⊤Xˆ)]/N (21)
= ηE[Tr(B⊤(BB⊤)−1B)]/N =
√
M/N.
Sum reconstruction: Xˆ = ηMB. Constant η is s.t. the
expectation of the average squared norm of ‖xˆi‖2 equals 1.
E[
∑N
i=1 ‖xˆi‖2]
N
= η2E[Tr(Xˆ⊤Xˆ)]/N
= η2E[Tr((BB⊤)2)]/N. (22)
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Figure 4: Reconstruction from LSH: a(x) as a func-
tion of D/d. Empirical mean, min. and max. over
10,000 reconstructions. Unif. Tight Frame (plain),
Gaussian i.i.d. (dashed), Eq. (8) (+) and Eq. (9) (o).
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Figure 5: Reconstruction from memory vectors:
a(x) as a function of m/n. Empirical mean, min., and
max. over 40,000 reconstructions. Pseudo-inverse
(plain), average (dashed), Eq. (14) (o) and (15) (+).
We define B˜ := (B−ν1M:N )
ν(1−ν)
with ν := n/N . Its columns
are centered random vectors whose covariance matrix is the
identity. The eigenvalues of their empirical covariance ma-
trix B˜B˜⊤/N follows the Marchenko-Pastur distribution. For
large N and γ = M/N , we then have:
E[Tr((B˜B˜⊤)2)]/MN2 = 1 + γ. (23)
Expressing (BB⊤)2 as a function of B˜B˜⊤ leads to:
E[Tr((BB⊤)2)] = ν2MN2(1− ν2+ γ(1− ν)2+ ν2M), (24)
which gives the value of η thanks to (22). On the other
hand, the expectation of the average correlation is given by:
E[
∑j
i=1 x
⊤
i xˆi]
N
= ηE[Tr(X⊤XB⊤(B⊤B)−1B]/N
= ηE[Tr(B⊤(B⊤B)−1B]/N = ηM/N
=
√
γ
1− ν2 + γ(1− ν)2 + ν2M (25)
